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Who Has a Better Idea?
Innovation, Shared Capitalism, 
and Human Resources Policies
Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
7.1    Introduction
Even in today’s challenging economic conditions, innovation as a means 
for organizations to create and maintain a competitive advantage remains 
a strategic imperative (Mahroum 2008). Organizations that are able to con-
tinually generate innovative products and services are better able to retain 
their current customer base and develop a new customer base.
Unlike the traditional view of innovation as the activity performed by the 
lone R&D scientist working in isolation, today’s organizations embrace the 
ideas and insights of employees at all levels of the organization. For example, 
Whirlpool credits their recent successful product innovations not to a couple 
of departments, such as engineering or marketing. Instead, they contrib-
ute their success to the 61,000 employees who have the ability to contrib-
ute and develop product, service, or processes innovations (Business Week 
2006).
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Given the new organizational context for innovation, it is important to 
understand how employees at all levels of the organization can be managed 
to direct and align their behaviors to achieve innovative outcomes. For ex-
ample, Annalee Saxenian, in her seminal work on organizational innova-
tion, contrasts two traditional innovation hubs of America: Silicon Valley in 
California and Route 128 surrounding Boston. Her work indicates that two 
management practices, organizational structures and rewards, were critical 
to accounting for diﬀerences in innovation output. Silicon Valley spawned 
innovation through shared capitalism and the use of teams, while innovation 
in the Boston corridor was stymied by bureaucratic top-  down approaches 
to organizational structure and rewards.
Likewise, in their book In the Company of Owners, Blasi, Kruse, and 
Bernstein (2003) examined in detail one innovation sector, the 100 largest 
corporations that built, run, and sell on the Internet. They highlight the 
major role that shared capitalism practices in combination with a participa-
tive culture can make in promoting organizational innovation.
Recognizing the importance of innovation for today’s organizations, this 
study will examine the role shared capitalism and high performance work 
policies play as a means to achieve innovation outcomes. Additionally, we 
will examine a process mechanism, employee alignment, as one way in which 
shared capitalism and high performance work policies impact innovation 
outcomes.
7.2    Literature  Review
7.2.1      Can Shared Capitalism Promote Innovation?
Despite the numerous studies on performance eﬀects of shared capital-
ism, there are only a few studies that discuss or examine the importance of 
shared capitalism in achieving product, service, or process innovations.
Gamble (2000) ﬁ  nds reduced R&D expenditures in ﬁ  rms where Employee 
Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) own larger blocks of stock and argues 
that this reﬂ  ects management entrenchment and managerial risk aversion; 
in contrast, Kruse (1996) ﬁ  nds that R&D expenditures are a strong predic-
tor of the use of a proﬁ  t-  sharing plan, and Sesil et al. (2002) ﬁ  nd positive 
eﬀects of broad-  based stock options in high technology knowledge-  based 
industries, noting that “for ﬁ  rms, in which new product development is cru-
cial for success, such as in many knowledge-  based industries, broad-  based 
stock options can reduce the agency problem, resulting in greater output” 
(276). Most recently, and supporting Sesil et al.’s perspective, Lerner and 
Wulf (2006), using a sample of 300 publicly-  traded R&D centralized ﬁ  rms, 
found that the compensation of corporate R&D heads had dramatically 
shifted in the 1990s, with a heaver reliance on long-  term incentives such as 
stock options. They ﬁ  nd long- term incentives are positively and signiﬁ  cantly Who Has a Better Idea?    2 2 7
associated with the number of patent ﬁ  lings, patents’ perceived value (patent 
citations), and patent generality.
While research that examines the role of shared capitalism as a means to 
achieve innovation outcomes is in its infancy, social and behavior psycholo-
gists have actively examined the impact of individual rewards on creative 
behavior (Amabile 1988; Amabile and Gryskiewicz 1989; Deci and Ryan 
1985; Eisenberger and Selbst 1994). Thus, we brieﬂ  y present empirical evi-
dence and theoretical perspectives from the social and behavioral schools 
of psychology.
Social-  cognitive psychologists assert that creative behavior has deﬁ  ning 
characteristics that make it distinguishable from other human behavior; in 
particular, creative behavior is dependent on employees’ intrinsic motivation 
(Amabile 1988; Deci and Ryan 1985). Thus, the aim for social-  cognitive 
psychologists is to uncover the conditions that enhance employee’s intrin-
sic motivation. According to this line of reasoning, extrinsic rewards, such 
as shared capitalism, will have a detrimental eﬀect on employee’s intrinsic 
motivation and ultimately their creative behavior by directing employee’s 
attention toward the reward itself over the task at hand.
In contrast, behavioral psychologists argue that the eﬀort needed to com-
plete activities is an unpleasant sensation produced by repeated or intense 
performance of any behavior. Reinforcements, such as rewards, are a means 
by which organizations can reduce this unpleasant sensation. If an employee 
is rewarded for putting in a large amount of eﬀort in an activity or behav-
ior (for example, through shared capitalism) it reduces the adverse impact 
of such behaviors and increases this behavior in the future. In eﬀect, rein-
forcements work to control employee’s creative behavior by decreasing the 
unpleasant sensations associated with the cognitive eﬀort needed to perform 
creativity.
Empirically, an abundance of studies in the past thirty years have been 
conducted to understand if and under what conditions rewards enhance or 
inhibit creative behavior, with contradictory results and conclusions. Recog-
nizing the conﬂ  icting evidence, ﬁ  ve meta-  analyses aimed to bring cohesion 
to the divergent results (Rummel and Feinberg 1988; Wiersma 1992, Tang 
and Hall 1995; Cameron and Pierce 1994; Eisenberger and Cameron 1996; 
Deci, Koesterner, and Ryan 1999). Of the ﬁ  ve, the strongest support for the 
Cognitive Evolution Theory comes from Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), 
who combined 128 studies to ﬁ  nd that all tangible and intangible rewards 
undermined intrinsic motivation. However, conclusions from Eisenberger 
and Cameron’s (1996) extensive review indicate that: (a) the detrimental 
eﬀects of rewards tend to occur in highly restricted, easily avoidable condi-
tions; (b) mechanisms of instrumental and classical conditions are basic for 
understanding the incremental and detrimental eﬀects of rewards on task 
motivation; and (c) the positive eﬀects of rewards on performance are easily 
attainable using procedures derived from behavioral theory.228    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
Taken together, past theory and empirical work on creativity and rewards 
has failed to provide an understanding of how best, if at all, to reward 
employees to achieve creative behavior. Additionally, the application of this 
research to organizational setting is restricted. First, the majority of studies 
in this ﬁ  eld have been conducted outside of organizations and relied heavily 
on schoolchildren, making the generalizability of these ﬁ  ndings limited. Sec-
ond, organizations are increasingly employing group/ team or organizational 
incentives over individual incentives as a means to encourage cooperation 
and alignment (Blasi and Kruse 2006). Thus, studies examining individual 
incentives provide only a limited understanding of the full range of work-
place incentives. Third, the sample sizes of the aforementioned studies are 
generally small. For example, of the 128 studies examined in Deci, Koest-
ner, and Ryan’s (1999) meta-  analysis the largest sample was 249 employees, 
with the majority of sample sizes well under 100 employees. While signiﬁ  -
cant eﬀects can often be detected with these sample sizes (depending on the 
study design), a contribution of this study to the current literature is the 
large sample size obtained in an organizational setting (more than 25,000 
employees in hundreds of work sites) with data on several types of work-
place incentives.
7.2.2      Can Employment Practices Promote Innovation?
In contrast to the limited research on organizational incentives, inno-
vation management scholars have actively researched individual human 
resource management policies that impact innovation outcomes, including 
job design (Hackman and Oldham 1980), selection (Woodman, Sawyer, and 
Griﬃn 1993; Iansiti 1995), training (Wheatley, Anthony, and Maddox 1991), 
and performance management (Mehr and Schaver 1996). Mumford (2000) 
reviews an extensive body of literature examining speciﬁ  c human resource 
management policies that support innovation and creativity. Building on 
this review, the following sections summarize the management policies that 
are supportive of innovation and creativity in organizations.
Selection
The consistent development of innovative products, services, and pro-
cesses requires a workforce with the necessary breadth and depth of tech-
nical skills (Amabile and Gryskiewicz 1989; Iansiti 1995), in combination 
with a constant ﬂ  ow of new ideas and experience (Bontis, Crossan, and Hul-
land 2002; Jackson and Schuler 2002). Staﬃng practices work as a means 
to ensure a consistent ﬂ  ow of technical skills, by identifying and select-
ing applicants who will add new ideas and experience to the organization. 
Researchers have examined the employee characteristics supportive of inno-
vation: divergent thinking (Guilford 1950), technical expertise (Amabile and 
Gryskiewicz 1989; Mumford 2000), and certain personality characteristics 
(Amabile 1988; King 1990).Who Has a Better Idea?    2 2 9
Training and Job Rotation
Maintaining employees’ current knowledge and skills, while developing 
new knowledge and skills, is essential to innovative performance (Cohen 
and Leventhal 1990; Mumford 2000). Two HR policies vital to maintaining 
and developing employees to achieve innovative outcomes are training and 
development (Leonard- Barton 1992). A ﬁ  rm’s potential to be innovative and 
creative is enhanced as the new knowledge and abilities are incorporated into 
the organization (Jackson and Schuler 2002; Cohen and Leventhal 1990). 
Thus, past research has noted the importance of sabbaticals, subtracting 
assignments, self-  study programs, conferences, external courses, and job 
rotations as important mechanisms to enhance an organization’s ability to 
innovate (Dougherty 1992; Mumford 2000; Christensen and Raynor 2003; 
Amabile 1983).
Performance Management
Performance evaluations have been both negatively and positively asso-
ciated with individual innovation and creativity (Amabile 1979; Shalley 
1995). For instance, Amabile (1979) found that individuals who expected 
their artistic task to be externally evaluated had signiﬁ  cantly lower levels 
of creativity on the task than individuals not being externally evaluated. In 
contrast, Shalley (1995) conducted two studies with samples of undergradu-
ate students; the results of both studies indicate that expecting an evaluation 
is not necessarily harmful to people’s creativity. The variance in empirical 
evidence may be explained by the type of performance evaluation. Perfor-
mance appraisals should not have speciﬁ  c performance objectives or diﬃcult 
production outcomes (Mumford 2000; Oldham 2003). Instead, appraisals 
are most conducive to creativity when they consist of broadly deﬁ  ned goals 
and objectives that allow employees ﬂ  exibility as to what the ﬁ  nal outcome 
will be (Mumford 2000).
Rewards (Recognition)
As mentioned before, evidence for the impact of individual rewards on 
creative behavior is mixed. However, for those researchers who support 
the role of rewards or recognition (both intrinsic and extrinsic) for crea-
tivity, other questions remain, such as the skills, behaviors, or outcomes that 
should be rewarded. For instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1994) in their 
investigation of the pharmaceutical industry suggest ﬁ  rms that promote 
researchers according to their standing in the scientiﬁ  c community enjoyed 
higher productivity levels. Additionally, rewards should not be withheld 
from employees who step out of established roles or fail to achieve desired 
outcomes. Instead, a better approach is to reward employees for their eﬀort 
or progress toward an innovation/ creative goal or objective (Mumford 2000). 
Finally, Dougherty (1992), after extensive ﬁ  eld research on product devel-230    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
opment, suggests that rewards should be provided for the development of 
expertise, skills, and competencies. Thus, beyond compensation, other forms 
or rewards and recognition can be used to enhance creative behavior.
Employee Involvement
Empowering employees and utilizing teams are two mechanisms through 
which employee participation can enhance organizational innovation 
(Mumford 2000). Christensen and Raynor (2003) in a recent book argue 
that successful product innovation requires big decisions to be driven down 
to the lowest level. They reason that decisions about products, services, and 
processes innovations should be made on the spot, instead of waiting for 
a response from further up in the organization. Additionally, Jelinek and 
Schoonhoven (1990) note that employee involvement helps employees to 
see their part in the innovation process while creating a shared responsibil-
ity in the outcome. Supporting this, Leonard-  Barton (1992), in her study 
of innovative projects groups, found that empowerment is most important 
for innovative capabilities. Those project teams who were empowered felt 
“exhilarated by the challenges they had created” (117).
Teamwork
The use of team- based work is a popular mechanism for enhancing inno-
vation. Innovations involve diﬀerent types of tasks and processes, and thus 
are rarely the creation of one individual or a single department. Team- based 
work has been argued to increase the speed of product innovation (Hayes, 
Wheelwright, and Clark 1988), the number of innovations (Dougherty 1992), 
and the value of the innovation (Ven de Ven 1986). For example, Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991) conducted a qualitative study where they found that the 
use of cross-  functional teams is central to the product development pro-
cess. Additionally, eﬀective product development was not housed in solely 
specialized R&D activities; instead, the most eﬀective product development 
came from creating linkages between various departments within the organ-
ization. Thus, the use of teams enhances product innovation through the 
diversity of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
Systems Perspective
While the aforementioned policies appear to be valuable for innovation, 
recent work recognizes the importance of examining Human Resource 
Management (HRM) policies as a bundle or system of policies as opposed to 
individual policies in isolation (MacDuﬃe 1995; Huselid 1995; Ichniowski 
et al. 1996; Blasi and Kruse 2006). A central tenet of the systems approach 
is that organizations should create a high degree of internal consistency 
among their HRM policies (Baird and Meshoulam 1988). Systems of HRM 
policies that are designed to utilize the knowledge and skills of the workforce 
have been labeled as “high performance,” “high involvement,” “high com-
mitment,” “HR sophistication,” and “HR investment.”Who Has a Better Idea?    2 3 1
Interestingly, there is wide disagreement on what policies constitute “high 
performance.” A recent review by Lepak et al. (2006) highlights the dispa-
rate and at times conﬂ  icting policies making up high performance systems. 
While disagreement remains over the policies represented in a “high perfor-
mance” work system, it is generally agreed that a high performance work 
system (HPWS) can impact various organizational outcomes. Collectively, 
twenty years of cumulative research has found HPWS are strongly associ-
ated with outcomes including HRM outcomes (i.e., turnover, absenteeism, 
job satisfaction); organizational outcomes (i.e., productivity, quality, ser-
vice); ﬁ  nancial accounting outcomes (i.e., ROA, proﬁ  tability); and capital 
market outcomes (i.e., stock price, growth, returns) (Combs et al. 2006; 
Becker and Huselid 2006).1
As previously noted employee knowledge and skills are critical to achiev-
ing innovation outcomes. Thus, it is surprising that the systems approach 
has had limited application to innovation outcomes. Studies of high per-
formance workplace bundles have so far tended to focus on operational or 
ﬁ  nancial performance without measures of innovation. Given the limited 
empirical evidence, our study seeks to ﬁ  ll this gap by examining the impact 
of HPWS on innovation outcomes.
Taken together, the limited empirical work examining the eﬀects of shared 
capitalism and HPWS on innovation outcomes represents a gap in the litera-
ture that needs to be addressed. Our interest is to examine the relationship 
between shared capitalism, HPWS, and innovative outcomes, in addition to 
the intervening mechanisms that uncover how these relationships occur. The 
following theory and hypotheses development provides the rationale for why 
we expect these relationships to occur.
7.3    Theory  and  Hypotheses
Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) describe the principal-  agent problem as a 
fundamental one for the ﬁ  rm: “Indeed, for various reasons the owner of the 
ﬁ  rm must delegate several tasks to the members of the ﬁ  rm. This necessity 
raises the problem of managing information ﬂ  ows within the ﬁ  rm. . . . The 
starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delegating 
a task to an agent with private information” (2002, 2–  3). For the purposes 
of this article, one can think of the problem of innovation as how to get the 
members of the ﬁ  rm interested in working alone or together to use their 
information to achieve innovation that will proﬁ  t the owner of the ﬁ  rm. 
They cite the early work of both Chester Barnard and Charles Babbage in 
deﬁ  ning the relevance of shared capitalism for the agency problem. For ex-
ample, Babbage wrote:
1. Despite these positive performance outcomes, bundles of high performance workplace 
policies appear to have very low incidence among ﬁ  rms (Blasi and Kruse 2006). See Ichniowski 
et al. (1996) regarding the barriers to adoption of high performance policies.232    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
“The general principles on which the proposed system is founded, are: 
1. That a considerable part of the wages received by each person should 
depend on the proﬁ  ts made by the establishment; and 2. That every person 
(our emphasis) connected with it should derive more advantage from apply-
ing any improvement he might discover than he could by any other course.” 
(Laﬀont and Martimort 2002, 11 [quoting Babbage 1989, vol 8, 177])
One can readily see that Babbage is speciﬁ  cally addressing both shared capi-
talism and innovation (“any improvement”). Barnard’s views were more 
explicit and more extreme when he wrote:
“An essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to 
contribute their individual eﬀorts to the cooperative system. . . . Inad-
equate incentives mean dissolution, or changes in organizational purpose, 
or failure to cooperate. Hence in all sorts of organizations the aﬀording 
of adequate incentives becomes the most deﬁ  nitely emphasized task in 
their existence. It is probably in this aspect of executive work that failure 
is most pronounced.” (Laﬀont and Martimort 2002, 12 [quoting Barnard 
1938, 139])
The research on the eﬀect of individual incentives on innovation is mixed, 
as previously noted, while the research on teamwork generally shows it to 
be positively related to innovation eﬀorts. One of the purposes of shared 
capitalism plans is to enhance teamwork by creating greater cooperation 
and information sharing among co-  workers, and between workers and 
supervisors/  managers. Based on this our ﬁ  rst two hypotheses are:
HYPOTHESIS ONE: Shared capitalism incentives are associated with a 
workplace culture that is supportive of innovation eﬀorts.
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Shared capitalism incentives are associated with a 
greater willingness of employees to report innovative ideas.
In line with our interest in exploring the impact of employment culture—
speciﬁ  cally high performance work systems—on innovation, past theorists 
have given some thought to the role of organization design as a complement 
to incentives.
For example, Barnard virtually deﬁ  ned the high performance work system 
when he wrote about what Laﬀont and Mortimort call “nonmonetary in-
centives” as including: “personal nonmaterial opportunities; ideal benefac-
tions; . . . associational attractiveness; adaptation of conditions to habitual 
methods and attitudes; opportunity of enlarged participation; [and] the con-
dition of communion.” Barnard stressed that what we think of as ﬁ  nancial 
incentives had to be “reinforced by other incentives,” speciﬁ  cally referring to 
these organizational components (Laﬀont and Martimort 2002, 12 [quoting 
Barnard 1938, 142]).
In a modern economy where workers are often not manipulating physical 
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collecting, communicating, sharing, manipulating, and combining informa-
tion in novel and innovative ways. Physical monitoring by supervisors as a 
solution to the agency problem is very hard in these environments. Many of 
the features of high performance work systems that theorists like Huselid 
have deﬁ  ned as essential to innovations are based on information. A number 
of these high performance policies can create conditions that favor innova-
tion: good wages and beneﬁ  ts can produce high commitment and loyalty; 
selective recruitment can get the most informed and curious persons into 
an organization; training can upgrade their informational and cooperative 
skills; teamwork and job rotation can break down “rigid silos” between 
them; and employee involvement can bring them closer to the information 
that both customers and management possess. This is not dissimilar from the 
classic agency theory notion of the “revelation principle” in which societies 
have a problem in how to get “informed agents (to) reveal private informa-
tion to a planner who recommends actions” (Laﬀont and Martimort 2002, 
26– 7). One can conceive of a high performance work system as a workplace 
mechanism to make the revelation principle work.
Based on the theory and research linking high performance work systems 
to organizational performance, we expect that an HPWS will also contribute 
to an innovative culture and activity, and will complement shared capitalism 
plans. Our next four hypotheses are:
HYPOTHESIS THREE: High performance work systems are associated with 
a workplace culture that is supportive of innovation eﬀorts.
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: High performance work systems are associated with a 
greater willingness of employees to report innovative ideas.
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: Shared capitalism plans have a positive interaction with 
high performance work systems in predicting a workplace culture that is sup-
portive of innovation eﬀorts.
HYPOTHESIS SIX: Shared capitalism plans have a positive interaction with 
high performance work systems in predicting willingness of employees to report 
innovative ideas.
Finally, we expect that if the aforementioned eﬀects exist, they operate in 
part through greater alignment of employees with the company’s strategy. 
Our ﬁ  nal two hypotheses are:
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: Individual alignment with company strategy mediates 
the relationship of shared capitalism and high performance work systems to a 
workplace culture that is supportive of innovation eﬀorts.
HYPOTHESIS EIGHT: Individual alignment with company strategy mediates 
the relationship of shared capitalism and high performance work systems to 
the willingness of employees to report innovative ideas.234    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
7.4    Data  and  Methods
7.4.1    Data  Set
This chapter uses employee surveys from one large company in the NBER 
data set (described in “Studying Shared Capitalism” in the introduction to 
this volume). Unique to this company, the survey asked a series of questions 
about organizational innovation. The survey was administered in 2006 via 
paper and web-  based administration in one ﬁ  rm. A total of 27,825 usable 
surveys were returned for a response rate of 67.3 percent. Missing data for 
one or more of the variables reduced the sample to 25,014 respondents who 
had complete data for all of the variables.
7.4.2    Measures
Human Resource Management
The 5-  P model (Schuler 1992) identiﬁ  es the various ways in which HRM 
activities can be examined: as philosophies, policies, programs, practices, or 
processes. This study will examine HRM policies and practices.
Policies, as deﬁ  ned here, are the broadly deﬁ  ned HRM activities. For ex-
ample, performance-  based pay is a broadly deﬁ  ned measure of an HRM 
activity, but it can be implemented through a number of diﬀerent prac-
tices. By assessing HRM policies, a researcher is able to cast a wide net in 
understanding the HRM activities within the organization. However, HRM 
policies limit the detailed information on what speciﬁ  c practices make up 
a policy.
Alternatively, HRM practices are the speciﬁ  c HRM activities that are 
employed to implement an HRM policy. For example, under the policy 
of pay-  for-  performance there are diﬀerent HRM practices that can be 
employed to achieve the pay-  for-  performance policy. Assessing speciﬁ  c 
HRM practices provides a level of detail missed by HRM policies. In this 
study, the primary interest is the impact of shared capitalism, and its vari-
ous forms, as a means to achieve innovation outcomes. Thus, we examine 
the individual shared capitalism practices and a combined shared capital-
ism index that can be utilized to achieve innovation outcomes, discussed in 
more detail following.
We examine two systems of HRM policies. First, we analyze a high per-
formance work system (HPWS), which includes employee participation, 
training, job rotation or cross-  training, selection, job security, and infor-
mation sharing. The majority of questions (listed in appendix A) ask the 
respondent to report if she or he is covered by this policy. Second, a high 
performance work system measure was included that asked employees their 
perceptions of the eﬀectiveness of each high performance policy for their 
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of the high performance practices within the group of workers immediately 
surrounding the respondent. This is notable, since most HRM scholars do 
not bring high performance work literature down to the lowest level of the 
organization (notable exceptions include Allen, Shore, and Griﬃth [2003] 
and Zacharatos, Barling, and Iverson [2005]). In particular, this index mea-
sures team eﬀectiveness in the following areas: selection, performance goals, 
training, sharing information, meeting with customers, and rewards. This 
human resource policy index is referred to as high performance work system-
 team (HPWST).
Shared Capitalism
As noted previously, shared capitalism appears in a variety of forms. This 
study examines proﬁ  t/  gain sharing, employee ownership, and stock options. 
Proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing are combined here because this ﬁ  rm has 
one program combining elements of each: bonus payments are based both 
on company-  wide return on net assets, and on division performance. In 
addition, we examine the eﬀects of individual incentives. For each incentive 
plan, the presence of the incentive (yes/  no) and the extensiveness of the 
incentive (as a percent of total ﬁ  xed annual pay) are examined. Addition-
ally, a thermometer-  style index of shared capitalism was constructed. The 
index, described in appendix B, reﬂ  ects both whether workers have diﬀerent 
shared capitalism programs and whether these programs represent a high 
percentage of the worker’s ﬁ  xed annual pay.
Workplace Outcomes
After consulting with the research literature, two comprehensive mea-
sures of innovation were designed. The ﬁ  rst is focused on measuring aspects 
of a ﬁ  rm’s culture for innovation. According to organizational theory on 
creativity, employees’ innovative behavior can be inﬂ  uenced by the environ-
ment or culture an employee encounters (Amabile 1988). Thus, an impor-
tant outcome to understand is a culture that supports innovative behavior. 
An extensive review of the literature on cultures that support innovation 
revealed consistent characteristics across cultures that support innovation. 
For example, companies can promote innovation by fostering an environ-
ment that encourages employees to voice ideas or suggestions, provides the 
resources to further develop ideas, and recognizes the eﬀorts of employees 
who do try to innovate (Scott and Bruce 1994). Given the past literature, 
our study examines the characteristics listed previously. The speciﬁ  c items 
for the culture of innovation scale are listed in appendix A.
The second measure focuses on individual employee’s willingness to mar-
shal their innovative ideas and do something about it. Innovative behavior is 
characterized by a multistage process, with diﬀerent activities or behaviours 
necessary at each stage (Scott and Bruce 1994). In this study, we examine 
an employee’s ability and willingness to generate ideas, as opposed to their 236    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
actual innovative behavior. Speciﬁ  c items developed to assess employee will-
ingness to innovate are listed in appendix A.
Finally, we examine the extent to which employees are aligned with the 
goals and objectives of the organization (Huselid, Becker, and Beatty 2005). 
Aligning employees with organizational goals and objectives has become an 
increasingly important task; especially in organizations where employees’ 
knowledge and skills play a critical role in achieving strategic objectives, 
such as innovation. It is through alignment that employees are aware of 
how they can contribute to achieving organizational objectives. Much of 
the work arguing for the importance of aligning employees behind shared 
goals and objectives has been at a conceptual level (Wright and McMahan 
1992; Boswell and Wright 2002). Thus, this research contributes to the cur-
rent literature by going beyond the importance of aligning HRM policies to 
organizational strategy (Huselid 1995). It looks deeper into the organization 
for how employees, the individuals who implement strategic objectives, rec-
ognize and agree with them. Our interest is to examine if and to what extent 
shared capitalism and high performance work policies are eﬀective means to 
align a workforce behind organizational objectives. Our measure combines 
four items representing employee understanding and agreement with the 
company strategy, and employee views of whether the company provides 
the resources and culture necessary to implement that strategy.2
7.5    Empirical  Results
7.5.1    Culture  for  Innovation
Table 7.1 summarizes the empirical results on the relationship between 
shared capitalism, high performance work policies, and employees’ percep-
tion of a culture for innovation.
Shared Capitalism
In models (1), (3), and (5) we examine the impact of the shared capital-
ism index on employees’ perception of a culture for innovation. The results 
reveal that the shared capitalism index is positively related to employees’ 
perception of a culture for innovation (model [1]). The shared capitalism 
index remains positively related when HPWST is added to the equation 
(model [5]), but not when HPWS is added (model [3]), so there is only partial 
support for hypothesis one.
When the shared capitalism practices are broken out to examine their 
individual impact on employees’ perceptions of a culture for innovation 
(models [2], [4], and [6]), two shared capitalism practices are consistently 
related to employees’ perceptions of a culture for innovation: the percentage 
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of base pay going to proﬁ  t/ gain sharing, and owning company stock. These 
results stay strong when adding in either the HPWS or HPWST measure, 
supporting hypothesis one for these two pay practices.
High Performance Work Policies
A very consistent result in models (3) through (6) is the strong positive 
association between human resource management policies and employ-
ees’ perceptions of a culture for innovation. An examination of adjusted 
R2 with and without the human resource practices indicates that these prac-
tices greatly increase our ability to account for what might create a culture 
for innovation. These results support hypothesis three and underline the 
important role high performance policies have in creating and supporting 
a culture for innovation where employees are encouraged to innovate, are 
rewarded for this, and are provided the resources to do so.
7.5.2    Innovative  Ideas
Table 7.2 summaries the empirical results on the relationship between 
shared capitalism, high performance work policies, and employees’ willing-
ness and ability to innovate.
Shared Capitalism
In models (1), (3), and (5) we report the impact of the shared capitalism 
index on employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas 
to the organization. The results, consistent with those reported for a cul-
ture for innovation, ﬁ  nd that those employees who reported higher levels 
of shared capitalism also reported higher willingness and ability to contrib-
ute innovative ideas to the organization. These results remained signiﬁ  cant 
after including measures of high performance work policies, supporting 
hypothesis two.
When the shared capitalism policies are broken out in models (2), (4), and 
(6), employee ownership is again a signiﬁ  cant positive predictor of employ-
ees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas to the organization. 
Unlike the results for culture of innovation, however, proﬁ  t/  gain sharing as 
a percent of pay is not a signiﬁ  cant predictor, and in fact proﬁ  t/  gain sharing 
eligibility is a negative predictor in two of the models. These latter results 
contrast strikingly with the positive results for employee ownership, sug-
gesting that proﬁ  t sharing may focus workers toward short-  term outcomes 
and away from activities with a long-  term payoﬀ, while employee owner-
ship helps promote behavior like innovative activity that will have a longer-
 term  payoﬀ.3 This is because proﬁ  t sharing in the organization under study 
3. This interpretation was supported by several company representatives at the conference 
where this chapter was initially presented. One person noted that ROI, which stands for return 
on investment, was sometimes referred to by employees as “repression of innovation” because 
a focus on short-  term proﬁ  tability discourages investments in innovative activities that have a 
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 speciﬁ  cally rewards employees for productivity and operational achieve-
ments (such as on-  time customer delivery) of delivering current goods and 
services, which the organization sees as part of its existing repertoire of 
oﬀerings. Proﬁ  t sharing is not, however, tied to ideas or prototypes for future 
goods and services.
High Performance Work Policies
The impact of high performance work policies on employees’ willingness 
and ability to contribute innovative ideas to the organization is reported in 
models (3) through (6). The results, across all models, reveal a consistent and 
signiﬁ  cant positive relationship between both high performance work policy 
indexes and employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas 
to the organization. Given these results, support was provided for hypothesis 
four. Taken together, these results can be interpreted to signify that the use of 
high performance work policies is one way to increase employees’ willingness 
and ability to contribute innovative ideas to an organization.
An interesting note is that in comparison to the HPWS impact on a cul-
ture for innovation, it appears that the HPWS impact is not as substantial 
for willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas. We speculate that 
an employee’s ability to contribute innovative ideas may be accounted for 
by individual diﬀerences not captured in this study. For example, divergent 
thinking (Guilford 1950), openness to new experience (Feist 1998), and 
internal locus of control (Woodman and Schoenfeldt 1989) have all been 
related to highly innovative or creative individuals.
7.5.3      Complementarities between Human Resource 
Policies and Shared Capitalism
An important proposition of the systems perspective is that organiza-
tional outcomes will be enhanced to the extent that a ﬁ  rm’s human resource 
management activities ﬁ  t with and complement one another (Baird and 
Meshoulam 1988). The underlying rationale is that the more strongly human 
resources ﬁ  t together, the more consistent are the signals communicated 
to employees regarding the behaviors that are valued by the organization 
(Becker and Huselid 1998). While ﬁ  t can be tested using various statistical 
techniques (Venkatraman 1989), we employ a ﬁ   t- as- moderation hypothesis, 
testing whether the impacts of shared capitalism on innovation outcomes are 
dependent on the level of high performance work policies. Stated diﬀerently, 
we expect that the impact of shared capitalism on employees’ perceptions of 
a culture for innovation vary across levels of high performance work poli-
cies. To examine this, an interaction term was included in table 7.3 (models 
[1] and [2]).
The results indicate that shared capitalism does interact positively and sig-
niﬁ  cantly with both HPWS and HPWST and provides support for hypoth-
esis ﬁ  ve. The ﬁ  t between shared capitalism and HPWST was positively 
related to employees’ perception of a culture for innovation. Likewise, the Who Has a Better Idea?    2 4 1
interaction between shared capitalism and HPWS was positive and margin-
ally signiﬁ  cant. To further help with interpretation, the interaction results 
are portrayed in ﬁ  gure 7.1 (using table 7.3, model [2]). As seen there, shared 
capitalism has the most positive relationship to innovation culture when 
HPWST is at high levels, with a mild positive relationship when HPWST is 
at average levels. The relationship is negative when HPWST are at low levels, 
indicating that employees may perceive the innovation culture poorly when 
they are given the incentives, but not the tools, to make a diﬀerence—in 
this case the shared capitalism may be perceived as primarily a shifting of 
ﬁ  nancial risk to employees.
There are very diﬀerent results, however, in predicting willingness or abil-
ity to innovate. As reported in table 7.3 (models [3] and [4]) we ﬁ  nd that 
while the base eﬀects are positive and signiﬁ  cant, the interaction between 
the shared capitalism index and high performance work practices is nega-
tive and signiﬁ  cant for both HPWS and HPWST. These results indicate that 
when employees are covered by high performance work practices, the impact 
of shared capitalism policies on their willingness and ability to innovate for 
the organization is reduced. Put another way, the positive base eﬀects and 
negative interaction indicates that these two constructs may substitute for 
each other: the base eﬀect shows that shared capitalism has a positive eﬀect 
on innovative activity for those who are not covered by HPWS, but shared 
capitalism has a much smaller or neutral eﬀect for those who are covered 
by HPWS. An HPWS appears to provide a strong eﬀect on its own, perhaps 
making unnecessary the addition of shared capitalism incentives.
Table 7.3  Interactions between shared capitalism and high performance work policies in 
predicting innovation outcomes
Culture for innovation Innovative ideas
Independent variable   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4
Shared capitalism index –0.007 (0.005) –0.023 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.028 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.032 (0.009)∗∗∗
  HPWS 0.768  (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.463 (0.031)∗∗∗
  HPWST 0.161  (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.053 (0.006)∗∗∗
Shared capitalism index
  ∗HPWS 0.015 (0.009)∗ –0.045 (0.010)∗∗∗
  ∗HPWST 0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗ –0.004 (0.002)∗∗
n 26,361 25,977 26,250 25,875
Adjusted R2   0.134   0.185   0.157   0.149
Notes: All regressions include controls for country (twenty-  two dummies), occupation (ﬁ  ve dummies), 
mgt. level (three dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per week, 
union status, age, gender, marital status (two dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, 
number of kids, race (four dummies), disability status, ln(ﬁ  xed pay), and company ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Standard 
error in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.242    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
To further help with interpretation, the interaction results are portrayed in 
ﬁ  gure 7.2 (using table 7.3, model [4]). Shared capitalism has a strong positive 
association with innovative ideas for workers with low values on HPWST, 
and only a mild positive association when HPWST is at high levels. These 
illustrate the point made before: high performance work policies and shared 
capitalist incentives may act somewhat as substitutes here, with shared capi-
talism providing the strongest incentives for contributing ideas among those 
who have not been encouraged to contribute ideas through high perfor-
mance work policies.
Fig. 7.1    Innovation culture, shared capitalism, and high performance work systems
Fig. 7.2    Innovation ideas, shared capitalism, and high performance work systemsWho Has a Better Idea?    2 4 3
7.5.4    Alignment
Table 7.4 summarizes the empirical results on the relationship between 
shared capitalism, high performance work policies, and organizational 
alignment.
Shared Capitalism
The results listed in models (1), (3), and (4) indicate that shared capital-
ism may play a signiﬁ  cant and positive role in aligning employees behind 
the goals and objectives of the organization. Even in the presence of high 
performance work policies, shared capitalism continues to play a signiﬁ  cant 
and positive role in employee alignment. There are diﬀerent results when 
interacting shared capitalism with the two HPWS measures: the base eﬀect 
of shared capitalism stays strong and the interaction is insigniﬁ  cant in model 
(3), while the opposite is true in model (6). It is therefore unclear whether 
shared capitalism operates on its own or only in combination with HPWS 
in aﬀecting alignment. The results of speciﬁ  c shared capitalism practices 
on employee alignment are also not consistent between the models control-
ling for diﬀerent measures of HPWS. Stock option holding and proﬁ  t/  gain 
sharing as a percent of pay are predictors when controlling for HPWS, while 
proﬁ  t/  gain sharing eligibility and employee ownership as a percent of pay 
are predictors when controlling for HPWST. It is noteworthy that individual 
bonus eligibility (but not the bonus size) is a strong predictor of alignment, 
possibly reﬂ  ecting greater bonus eligibility among high- level managers (not 
fully captured in the management level controls).
High Performance Work Policies
Consistent with the results for a culture for innovation and innovative 
ideas, high performance work policies continue to have a strong impact in 
models (1) to (6) of table 7.4. An interesting ﬁ  nding is the relative impact 
of the HPWS versus the HPWST on alignment. The adjusted R- square  for 
the models with HPWST accounts for a greater amount of variance in the 
alignment of employees. This result could indicate that the greater impact 
on employee alignment is not when employees experience high perfor-
mance policies (HPWS), but when they perceive these practices as eﬀective 
(HPWST) in the context of their immediate local work group or team. This 
ﬁ  nding suggests that the level of measurement of high performance work 
practices is important.
Complementarities between Human Resource 
Policies and Shared Capitalism
Once again, using interaction terms we examined the impact of the com-
plementary relationship between human resource management policies 
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reported in model (6). Here shared capitalism interacts with HPWST and 
results in a positive eﬀect on employee alignment. This result conﬁ  rms the 
importance of ensuring that human resource policies and shared capital-
ism complement each other in order to achieve maximum beneﬁ  ts. Again, 
it is interesting to note that the interaction with shared capitalism was only 
signiﬁ  cant with HPWST, which indicates the importance of perceived policy 
eﬀectiveness in work groups over the mere presence of policies. It appears 
that such practices need not only to be bundled together but need to be bun-
dled together in a way that is seen as eﬀective within a local work group.
7.5.5      Mediating Role of Alignment
Across the results, a consistent ﬁ  nding is that HRM policies and shared 
capitalism are related to employees’ perception of a culture for innovation 
and employees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas. How-
ever, it is not clear how HRM policies and shared capitalism impact these 
outcomes (Becker and Gerhart 1996; Ostroﬀ and Bowen 2000). For instance, 
management scholars have argued that HRM policies impact organizational 
outcomes through organizational culture (Ostroﬀ and Bowen 2000), organi-
zational commitment (Allen, Shore, and Griﬀeth 2003), and employee skills, 
motivation, and opportunities (Lepak et al. 2006).
While the intervening mechanisms previously listed are plausible, our 
interest is the impact HRM policies have in creating employee alignment. 
To test for mediation, three models are run to test four conditions (Baron 
and Kenny 1986). First, the independent variable (HRM policies or shared 
capitalism index) must signiﬁ  cantly impact innovation outcomes. Second, 
the independent variable must signiﬁ  cantly impact the mediator (align-
ment). Third, with the independent variable in the equation, alignment must 
impact innovation outcomes. The fourth necessary condition is a decrease in 
the coeﬃcient between the independent variable and innovation outcomes 
as alignment is added. Using this technique it is possible to assess if the 
coeﬃcient between the independent variable and the outcomes decreased 
with alignment in the equation. The extent of reduction in the coeﬃcient 
reveals how much of the relationship between the independent variable and 
dependent is indirectly working through the mediator (alignment). Finally, 
Sobel’s test is employed to ensure that the drop in the coeﬃcient is signiﬁ  -
cantly diﬀerent from zero (Sobel 1982). Tables 7.5 and 7.6 report the results 
of the test of mediation.
Shared Capitalism
The results in tables 7.5 and 7.6 reveal that alignment does partially medi-
ate the relationship between shared capitalism and employee’s perception 
of a culture for innovation. This is indicated by the reduction in the shared 
capitalism coeﬃcient from model (4) to model (6), and a signiﬁ  cant value 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.248    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
way in which shared capitalism impacts innovation outcomes is by aligning 
the workforce behind the goals and strategic objectives of the organiza-
tion. However, the shared capitalism coeﬃcient was not reduced to zero for 
either outcome, implying other mechanisms are working between shared 
capitalism and innovation outcomes. These ﬁ  ndings indicate that the overall 
corporate culture that binds employees together (understanding and agree-
ing with common goals, having the tools and involvement to advance those 
goals, and believing the culture is right to achieve these goals) does play a 
key role in determining how shared capitalism incentives relate to innova-
tion, but that there still exists an independent incentive eﬀect from shared 
capitalism. This is very similar to Barnard’s view concerning the need for a 
package of monetary and nonmonetary incentives. The sense of common 
enterprise that results from shared capitalism appears to impact the agency 
problem by reinforcing a common culture among the members of the ﬁ  rm, 
yet the pure incentive eﬀect of shared rewards themselves also appears to 
focus the individual worker (similar to the ﬁ  ndings in Freeman, Kruse, and 
Blasi in chapter 2).
High Performance Work Policies
Also reported in tables 7.5 and 7.6 is the mediating role of alignment with 
high performance work policies. Speciﬁ  cally, the analysis reveals that align-
ment partially mediates the relationship that HPWS (models [1] through [3]) 
and HPWST (Models [4] through [6]) have with employees’ perception of a 
culture for innovation. A similar result is obtained in predicting and employ-
ees’ willingness and ability to contribute innovative ideas (table 7.6). These 
results indicate that part of the eﬀect of high performance work policies 
on innovation outcomes is through aligning the workforce behind shared 
goals and objectives. However, since the high performance work system 
coeﬃcients are not reduced to zero, high performance work policies also 
impact the innovation outcomes through additional means.
7.6    Conclusion
The principal ﬁ  ndings of this chapter are that shared capitalism and high 
performance work policies aﬀect innovation outcomes through direct eﬀects, 
interactions, and indirect eﬀects. The results of this study contribute to the 
current literature on shared capitalism and human resource management 
literature in a number of ways. First, empirical research on the importance 
of rewards and compensation practices as a means to achieve innovation 
outcomes is limited. This study adds to and extends the literature by exam-
ining multiple forms of shared capitalism and their impact on innovation 
outcomes. We demonstrate these eﬀects in a population of adult workers 
in a large sample of respondents in hundreds of work sites, which provides 
several advantages in relation to past research. Additionally, we were able Who Has a Better Idea?    2 4 9
to identify a possible mediating mechanism between shared capitalism and 
innovation outcomes. Second, taking a systems perspective, we investigate 
the impact of two systems of high performance work policies on innova-
tion outcomes. While innovation management scholars have examined the 
impact of individual human resource management practices on creativity or 
innovation, a systems approach has, to our knowledge, never been published 
(Harden 2006).
Organizations seeking to develop a culture of innovation could look to 
this research as an answer for how this occurs. Speciﬁ  cally, our results reveal 
that a culture for innovation can be developed and supported through the 
use of shared capitalism and high performance work practices. We found 
moderate support for the importance of pairing shared capitalism and high 
performance work practices together to achieve the greatest impact on a cul-
ture for innovation. Additionally, shared capitalism and high performance 
work practices work in part by aligning employees around the goals and 
objectives of the organization.
As organizations increasingly depend on all employees to contribute inno-
vative ideas to the organization, this research aims to address the role that 
shared capitalism and high performance work policies play to achieve these 
ends. The results of this study indicate that a means to promote employee 
willingness and ability to contribute innovation ideas is the use of high per-
formance work policies and shared capitalism, both of which had a strong 
positive relationship with this outcome. However, an interesting ﬁ  nding of 
this study is that the impact of shared capitalism on innovative ideas varies 
by the level of high performance work policies the employee experiences in 
his or her work group. And ﬁ  nally, the indirect eﬀect of high performance 
work practices and shared capitalism on innovative ideas indicates that an 
aligned employee is more willing and able to contribute innovative ideas to 
the organization. Shared capitalism and high performance work practices 
are one way to align an employee behind the goals and objectives of the 
organization.
To the extent that innovation can be conceived as a principal- agent prob-
lem, we have demonstrated that a system of shared incentives and a shared 
high performance employment culture at the lowest levels of organizations 
is important to create both an innovative environment that is fertile ground 
for innovative ideas, and the willingness to work on innovative ideas. Taken 
together, these ﬁ  ndings indicate that the overall corporate culture that binds 
employees together does play a key role in determining how shared capi-
talism incentives relate to innovation, but there still exists an independent 
incentive eﬀect from shared capitalism. The sense of common enterprise 
that results from shared capitalism appears to impact the agency problem 
by reinforcing a common culture among the members of the ﬁ  rm, yet the 
pure incentive eﬀect of shared rewards themselves also appears to focus the 
individual worker.250    Erika E. Harden, Douglas L. Kruse, and Joseph R. Blasi
In summary, these ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm several of the main themes of agency 
theory: that the principal-  agent problem can be addressed by incentives, 
and that agency conﬂ  icts respond to a cooperative culture between workers 
that encourages mutual monitoring and opportunities to share information. 
The results of this study make two unique and nuanced contributions to this 
perspective: ﬁ  rst, that it is the combination of shared incentives, cooperative 
culture, and mutual monitoring that works best, and second, that high per-
formance workplace systems help resolve agency problems when employees 
work in teams at the lowest level of the organization that are rich with rigor-
ous selection, training, information sharing, clear goals, and fair rewards.
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